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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
VOLUME 50 WINTER 1975 NUMBER 2
THE FEDERAL COURTS LOOK AT
PAROLE
MURRAY I. GuRFEIN*t
This year marks the centenary of the birth of parole' as a form
of early release from prison.2 New York State's Elmira Reforma-
tory, using a system adopted from the British Penal Servitudes Act,
pioneered the introduction of parole into this country.3 In Britain,
parole, or the "ticket of leave" as it was called, was based upon
industry and good conduct in prison. From its inception, however,
American penal experts expected the parole system to achieve ends
beyond the mere maintenance of prison discipline. The promoters
of parole saw it as a progressive tool for the rehabilitation of
prisoners, made more attractive by the coercive threat of
revocation and return to prison.4
By 1910, when Congress created the federal Board of Parole, 5
* Circuit Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. Judge Gurfein is
also Chairman of the Sentencing Committee of the Judicial Council of the Second Circuit.
t I am grateful to my law clerk, Vicki C. Jackson, for editing my manuscript to its
betterment and for providing valuable authorities for the footnotes from her great store of
knowledge of the subject. Ms. Jackson was one of the authors of Project, Parole Release
Decisionmaking and the Sentencing Process, 84 YALE L.J. 810 (1975), discussed in note 7 infra.
1 This Article emphasizes decisions of the United States Supreme Court and the Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit concerning federal parole as well as decisions of state courts
within this circuit relating to the parole of state prisoners. For reasons of space this Article
does not cover the availability of judicial review of federal parole decisions under the
Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 554 (1970). For an early decision denying review,
see Hyser v. Reed, 318 F.2d 225, 237 (D.C. Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 957 (1963)
("the [United States] Board [of Parole] does not adjudicate"). Recent decisions, however,
have found various provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act applicable to the Board
of Parole. See, e.g., Pickus v. United States Bd. of Parole, 507 F.2d 1107, 1108-13 (D.C. Cir.
1974); Mower v. Britton, 504 F.2d 396, 397-99 (10th Cir. 1974); King v. United States, 492
F.2d 1337, 1343-45 (7th Cir. 1974); Billiteri v. United States Bd. of Parole, 385 F. Supp.
1217, 1218-19 (W.D.N.Y. 1974).
2 See Note, Constitutional Law- Parole Release Hearings Not Subject to Judicial Review Nor
Do Procedural Due Process Rights Adhere - Scarpa v. United States Board of Parole, 23 EMORY
L.J. 597, 598 n.6 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Parole Release Hearings]; Note, Parole Revocation
in the Federal System, 56 GEO. L.J. 705 (1968).
3 C. NEWMAN, SOURCEBOOK ON PROBATION, PAROLE & PARDONS 25-34 (3d ed. 1968).
4See D. DRESSLER, PRACTICE AND THEORY OF PROBATION AND PAROLE 60-61 (1951); C.
NEWMAN, SOURCEBOOK ON PROBATION, PAROLE & PARDONS 37 (3d ed. 1968).
s Act of June 25, 1910, ch. 387, § 2, 36 Stat. 819 (now 18 U.S.C. § 4201 (1970)).
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the concept of parole had grown in popularity and had developed
a character distinct from what became known as "good time" laws
which provided for mandatory release earlier than the expiration
of the maximum sentence. 6 As an added avenue of mercy and
relief from excessively long sentences, the increased use of parole
saw a corresponding decrease in the relative importance of the
executive pardon power. Today, parole is the expected form of
release for most prisoners in this country. 7
Because parole boards were meant to foster rehabilitation by
the use of difficult predictive decisions, they were commonly given
broad discretion to determine whether and when to release an
inmate. The federal parole statute quite typically provides:
If it appears to the Board of Parole from a report by the proper
institutional officers or upon application by a prisoner eligible for
release on parole, that there is a reasonable probability that such
prisoner will live and remain at liberty without violating the laws,
and if in the opinion of the Board such release is not
incompatible with the welfare of society, the Board may in its
discretion authorize the release of such prisoner on parole.8
The two criteria mentioned in the statute, together with the statu-
tory reservation of decisions to the Board's discretion, shed no
light, however, on the functional relationship between the parole
board and the sentencing judge.
As a matter of logic, the parole decision is an extension of the
sentencing responsibility initially exercised by the judge in the
sense that it determines the length of imprisonment under a
6 By Act of June 21, 1902, ch. 1140, § 1, 32 Stat. 397 (now 18 U.S.C. § 4161 (1970)),
Congress provided for the automatic reduction of maximum prison sentences by the num-
ber of days accumulated for good conduct while in prison. Until 1932, prisoners released at
the end of their sentence, less this "good time," had no supervision since the "good time"
laws focused narrowly upon the inmate's conduct in prison. But, by Act of June 29, 1932, ch.
310, § 4, 47 Stat. 381 (now 18 U.S.C. § 4164 (1970)), Congress provided that persons
mandatorily released are to be treated as if they had been released on parole. The "good
time" laws, however, continue to be sharply distinguishable from laws governing parole.
Although accumulated "good time" may be revoked or suspended for bad behavior, the
Supreme Court has required that certain procedural safeguards accompany the forfeiture of
"good time." Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 557-58 (1974). And, reflecting an orienta-
tion towards in-prison conduct, mandatory release involves no discretionary judgment since
the accumulation of credits is governed by statute. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 4161,4163 (1970). But see
id. § 4162.
7See Project, Parole Release Decisionmaking and the Sentencing Process, 84 YALE L.J. 810, 814
nn.4 & 6 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Project, Parole Release Decisionmaking]. This valuable
work was written by three law students who were permitted to observe actual parole
hearings, conducted under the new federal guidelines, see notes 62-70 and accompanying
text infra, at the Danbury, Lewisburg, and Alderson federal facilities.
1 18 U.S.C. § 4203(a) (1970), as amended, (Supp. IV, 1974). See addendum.
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sentence previously imposed.9  Since the early reformers
emphasized mitigating the harsh punishment imposed by judges
and individualizing treatment of offenders with a view towards
rehabilitation, parole decisions were understandably lodged in
agencies which were not involved in the original sentencing
decision. In theory, parole boards would need to know more about
the individual offender than the judge could and would measure
rehabilitation inside the prison in terms of individual progress.
In this country's century old experience with parole, however,
public, judicial, and correctional concerns have varied to reflect a
wide spectrum of attitudes and expectations. In recent years, the
division of responsibility between judges and parole boards has
resulted, at times, in an appearance of unaccountability, indeed of
chaos and failure, in our system of postconviction justice.
Recidivism statistics, crime rates, prison riots, and disrespect for
law and legal institutions are all testaments that this appearance of
failure is no illusion. And public malaise about recidivism tends to
focus blame on the parole process.
This anniversary year may be a particularly appropriate time,
therefore, to reconsider the functions of judges and parole boards
in the sentencing process. Two forces have become prominent in
recent years: unhappiness with the operation of parole from the
standpoint of society and greater concern for the convicted felon.
In response to these concerns, during the past three years there
has been a greater willingness by the courts to review legal
challenges to the parole decisionmaking process. Some parole
boards have voluntarily abandoned old practices and instituted
startlingly new procedures. Moreover, in long-awaited response to
years of criticism of the federal penal code and sentencing and
parole laws, Congress is now considering several bills to revise these
statutes. The reforms, by and large, commendably aim at better
protection of the rights of prisoners.10 Since such major revisions
cannot be hoped for more often than once in several decades,
those who look to legislative reform in this area must speak now.
9 R. DAWSON, SENTENCING: THE DECISION AS TO TYPE, LENGTH, AND CONDITIONS OF
SENTENCE 5 (1969); TASK FORCE ON CORRECTIONS, PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAW EN-
FORCEMENT AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, REPORT ON CORRECTIONS 85-86 (1967)
[hereinafter cited as TASK FORCE ON CORRECTIONS]; Kadish, Legal Norm and Discretion in the
Police and Sentencing Processes, 75 HARV. L. REv. 904, 920-26 (1962).
10 Substantive reform of the prison system has largely been neglected by legislators and
is not within the scope of this Article.
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I
Until recently parole boards of the states and the nation were
free from judicial review of any kind. A convicted felon was held to
be a "slave" of the state, a" and the amelioration of punishment
which probation or parole provided was deemed a "privilege."
Justice Cardozo wrote that the Constitution did not require that a
revocation of probation be accompanied by notice or a hearing
since probation "comes as an act of grace."' 2 Though not
originated by Justice Cardozo, this conception set the tone that led
courts to deny review of parole decisions for three decades,"
thereby precluding review on the merits and, presumptively, even
of the fairness of the procedure that led to the parole decision. Nor
was the normal presumption that agency action is reviewable
1 4
applied, since the courts assumed that parole release was merely a
privilege dependent upon the bounty of a governmental agency to
whose sole discretion the release decision had been committed.1
5
Tied to the right-privilege theory was the additional
justification that the parole board acted as paterfamilias. The parole
board, as such, was thought to need no help from anyone, least of
all the prisoner, in deciding whether to grant parole. One could
scarcely have an adversary proceeding with one's own father since
both father and child have the same goal: the child's happiness.
16
" Ruffin v. Commonwealth, 62 Va. (21 Gratt.) 790, 796 (1871).
12 Escoe v. Zerbst, 295 U.S. 490, 492-93 (1935).
3 See, e.g., Richardson v. Rivers, 335 F.2d 996, 999 (D.C. Cir. 1964); Godoy v. United
States Bd. of Parole, 345 F. Supp. 1292, 1295 (C.D. Cal. 1972); United States v. Lewis, 274 F.
Supp. 184, 189 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); Berry v. United States Bd. of Parole, 266 F. Supp. 667, 668
(M.D. Pa. 1967). For an excellent discussion of other theories justifying judicial noninterven-
tion, see Comment, The Parole System, 120 U. PA. L. REv. 284, 286-97 (1971). One example is
the "change in custody" theory which views parole as a mere change in the degree of custody
imposed and hence purely an internal matter for prison authorities to decide. One final
theory of parole, favored by some penologists, is the "contract theory." According to this
concept, the parole release decision is arrived at through a mutual agreement between the
inmate and the parole decider regarding the conditions of the prospective parolee's release.
If the inmate refuses to agree, he is not released, and if, after release, he violates a condition,
due process is not required to revoke his parole since the matter involves only the enforce-
ment of a contract. Even this theory has proved vulnerable to judicial review in recent years,
however, because the courts invoke equitable doctrines to redress the imbalance in bargain-
ing power that prevails in such situations. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Schuster v. Vincent,
524 F.2d 153 (2d Cir. 1975).
14 See 5 U.S.C. § 701(a) (1970).
5 See, e.g., Tarlton v. Clark, 441 F.2d 384, 385 (5th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 403
U.S. 934 (1971); 18 U.S.C. §§ 4201, 4208 (1970); id. § 4203, as amended, (Supp. IV, 1974);
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 70.40(1)(a) (McKinney 1975).
16 Chief Justice Burger noted that "realistically the failure of the parolee is in a sense a
failure for his supervising officer." Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 485-86 (1972)
(footnote omitted). The implication is that a parole officer is more a social worker than a
policeman. When he was a circuit judge, the Chief Justice wrote that "the Parole Board in
revoking parole occupies the role of parent withdrawing a privilege from an errant child not
[Vol. 50:223
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Carried to its logical conclusion, this meant that the prisoner had
no constitutional right to due process under the fifth or fourteenth
amendments.1 7
In recent years the distinction between rights and privileges as
the basis for determining the applicability of due process
protection has been elided in a line of cases beginning with Sherbert
v. Verner. 8 In terms of prisoners' rights, the Supreme Court came
to recognize by the early 1960's that a prisoner did not lose all his
constitutional rights when the door of the prison closed behind
him. The vague prohibitions of the eighth amendment were no
longer considered the sole constitutional protector of the convicted
prisoner. Cases involving judicial supervision of prison conditions,
including prison discipline, are now legion. Violations of due pro-
cess and first amendment rights in both federal and state penal
institutions have come within the jurisdiction of the federal
courts,1 9 and federal judges now regulate and close state detention
facilities as a matter of course when necessary to protect the rights
of inmates.2 °
The extension of constitutional standards and meaningful ju-
dicial review to the parole process, however, required a new view of
parole as well as of changing constitutional doctrine. In Morrissey v.
Brewer,21 Chief Justice Burger, writing for the majority, rejected
the theory that parole was a "mere privilege" and held that due
process requires certain minimal procedural protections when
revocation of parole is sought. These include an inquiry in the
nature of a preliminary hearing to determine probable cause, to be
conducted at or reasonably near the place of the alleged parole
violation or arrest as promptly as possible, and a revocation hearing
at which certain specified minimal due process requirements must
as punishment but for misuse of the privilege." Hyser v. Reed, 318 F.2d 225, 237 (D.C. Cir.)
(en banc), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 957 (1963). See also Scarpa v. United States Bd. of Parole, 477
F.2d 278, 281 (5th Cir.) (en banc), vacated and remanded, 414 U.S. 809, dismissed as moot, 501
F.2d 992 (5th Cir. 1973).
'7 The sixth amendment was said by the then Circuit Judge Warren Burger to be in-
applicable to parole revocation proceedings because by its terms it governs only "criminal
prosecutions." Hyser v. Reed, 318 F.2d 225, 237 (D.C. Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 375 U.S.
957 (1963), citing Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547, 563 (1892).
18 374 U.S. 398 (1963). See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262 (1970); Graham v.
Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 374 (1971); Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972);
Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 644 (1973).
"See, e.g., Mukmuk v. Commissioner of the Dep't of Correctional Servs., 529 F.2d 272
(2d Cir. 1976); Sostre v. McGinnis, 334 F.2d 906 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 892 (1964).20 See, e.g., Rhem v. Malcolm, 371 F. Supp. 594 (S.D.N.Y.), supplemented, 377 F. Supp.
995 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd in part and remanded, 507 F.2d 333 (2d Cir. 1974), on remand, 389 F.
Supp. 964 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd per curiam, Nos. 75-2098, 75-2104 (2d Cir., Dec. 5, 1975).
21408 U.S. 471 (1972).
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be observed. 22 The opinion emphasized that "[d]uring the past 60
years, the practice of releasing prisoners on parole before the end
of their sentences has become an integral part of the penological
system ... [and is not] an ad hoc exercise of clemency .... -23 This
recognition that parole release is part of the process of justice was
an important departure from the earlier view.
In rejecting the view that parole is an act of grace, the Court,
both in Morrissey and in Gagnon v. Scarpelli,24 placed great emphasis
on both the rehabilitative functions of parole and the nonadversar-
ial relationship between prisoner and board. In holding that under
certain circumstances a probationer or parolee is entitled to
retained or appointed counsel at a revocation hearing, the Court in
Scarpelli echoed the language of Morrissey: "the 'purpose [of
probation and parole] is to help individuals reintegrate into society
as constructive individuals as soon as they are able . ... , ,5
Additionally, the Court implied that the dominant context of
parole decisions other than revocation is one of nonadversarial
benevolence - the paterfamilias view.
The Morrissey Court, in extending due process to parole
revocation, adopted a different analysis from that of Mempa v.
Rhay, 26 where the Court had held that the imposition of a deferred
sentence after revocation of probation was part of the initial prose-
cution and required the presence of counsel.2 7 In Morrissey there
was no suggestion that revocation of parole was part of the
sentencing process. Parole revocation now stood on its own as a
process requiring minimum due process, which, as the Court rec-
ognized in Scarpelli, included a limited right to counsel.
22 At the revocation hearing the minimal requirements include: (1) a written notice of
claimed parole violations; (2) disclosure of the evidence against the parolee; (3) an opportu-
nity to be heard in person and to present witnesses and documentary evidence; (4) the right
to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses unless the hearing officer specifically finds
good cause for not allowing confrontation; (5) a neutral and detached hearing body such as
a traditional parole board; and (6) a written statement by the factfinders of the evidence
relied upon and the reasons for revocation of parole. Id. at 489.
23 Id. at 477.
24411 U.S. 778 (1973).
251d. at 783, quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 477 (1972).
26 389 U.S. 128 (1967).
27 The Mempa Court had emphasized three reasons for its holding: (1) protection of
those rights of the defendant that might otherwise be waived; (2) enhancement of the
accuracy of the sentencing determination; and (3) introduction and presentation of mitigat-
ing evidence in support of minimal punishment. Id. at 135-37. The latter two reasons seem
to have some application to parole release and revocation determinations. For a discussion of
the similarity between parole release and sentencing decisions for Mempa due process
purposes, see Kadish, The Advocate and the Expert - Counsel in the Peno-Correctional Process, 45
MINN. L. REV. 803, 827 (1961); Project, Parole Release Decisionmaking, supra note 7, at 854-58;
Comment, Due Process: The Right to Counsel in Parole Release Hearings, 54 IowA L. REv. 497
(1968).
[Vol. 50:223
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Once the Supreme Court had opened the door to judicial
review of the revocation stage of the parole process, the lower
courts were under increased pressure to extend the protections of
the fifth and fourteenth amendments to the initial grant or denial
of parole as well.28 The obvious question became whether the due
process minima required in the parole revocation process are also
required in the parole release process.
Several arguments have been made to support a distinction.
For example, it has been urged that the grievous loss suffered by
the parolee, who has found a new life, and by his family, which
now has him home again, is more serious than the loss of an
expectation of parole suffered by the incarcerated person. It has
also been suggested that while the threshold ground for revocation
is more likely to be an allegation of a specific fact, release
proceedings typically involve congeries of factual considerations,
many requiring prophetic judgments. Finally, whereas the
balancing of individual interests with the practical needs of a parole
system may weigh against the individual in prerelease procedures
because of the sheer number of inmates subject to parole release
decisions, comparatively few parolees are involved in parole
revocation.
28 The impact of time and intervening decisions on a receptive judicial mind may be
seen by comparing Judge Burger's views on parole revocation procedures, as expressed in
Hyser v. Reed, 318 F.2d 225 (D.C. Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 957 (1963), with his
views as Chief Justice, as expressed in Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972). Those nine
years had seen a revolution insofar as abrogation of the right-privilege distinction is
concerned. See generally Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinction in Constitu-
tional Law, 81 HARV. L. REv. 1439 (1968).
In Bradford v. Weinstein, 519 F.2d 728 (4th Cir. 1974), the Fourth Circuit had held that
due process applies to parole release decisions and strongly suggested that the prisoner be
given reasons for denial and some opportunity to rebut the information which the parole
board was considering. The Supreme Court granted certiorari, 421 U.S. 998 (1975), but
vacated the case as moot when the plaintiff was released, 96 S. Ct. 347 (1975).
The number of federal and state cases dealing with due process claims relating to parole
release has grown rapidly in recent years. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Richerson v. Wolff,
525 F.2d 797 (7th Cir. 1975); Childs v. United States Bd. of Parole, 514 F.2d 1270 (D.C. Cir.
1974); King v. United States, 492 F.2d 1337, 1342-43 (7th Cir. 1974) (dictum); Franklin v.
Shields, 399 F. Supp. 309 (W.D. Va. 1975); Stassi v. Hogan, 395 F. Supp. 141 (N.D. Ga.
1975); Soloway v. Weger, 389 F. Supp. 409 (M.D. Pa. 1974); Cooley v. Sigler, 381 F. Supp.
441 (D. Minn. 1974); Craft v. Attorney General, 379 F. Supp. 538 (M.D. Pa. 1974);
Candarini v. Attorney General, 369 F. Supp. 1132 (E.D.N.Y. 1974); Masiello v. Norton, 364
F. Supp. 1133 (D. Conn. 1973); Johnson v. Heggie, 362 F. Supp. 851 (D. Colo. 1973);
United States ex rel. Harrison v. Pace, 357 F. Supp. 354 (E.D. Pa. 1973); In re Sturm, 11 Cal.
3d 258, 521 P.2d 97, 113 Cal. Rptr. 361 (1974) (en banc); Monks v. New Jersey State Parole
Bd., 58 N.J. 238, 277 A.2d 193 (1971); Solari v. Vincent, 46 App. Div. 2d 453, 363 N.Y.S.2d
332 (2d Dep't 1975); cf. United States ex rel. Campbell v. Pate, 401 F.2d 55 (7th Cir. 1968);
Sturm v. California Adult Auth., 395 F.2d 446, 450 (9th Cir. 1968) (Browning, J., concur-
ring), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 947 (1969); Williams v. United States Bd. of Parole, 383 F. Supp.
402 (D. Conn. 1974); Lupo v. Norton, 371 F. Supp. 156 (D. Conn. 1974); Freeman v.Schoen, 370 F. Supp. 1144 (D. Minn. 1974). See generally Comment, Procedural Protection at
Parole Release Hearings, 1974 DUKE L.J. 1119.
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The Supreme Court has not yet addressed the question of due
process in parole release proceedings, although it has recently
granted certiorari in Scott v. Kentucky Parole Board.29 The Second
Circuit, meanwhile, has had an unsteady time with the problem.
The question of whether a prisoner has a constitutionally protected
right to due process at a parole release hearing first arose in the
Second Circuit in 1970 in Menechino v. Oswald.30 Judge Mansfield,
writing for himself and Judge Anderson, with Judge Feinberg
dissenting, affirmed the decision of the district court and answered
the question in the negative. The prisoner, who conten ded that his
due process rights were violated by the procedure utilized in two
hearings before the New York State Board of Parole resulting in
parole denial, sought a declaratory judgment that he was entitled,
under the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment, to: (1)
notice of charges with a substantial summary of the evidence; (2) a
fair hearing, including the right to counsel, confrontation, and
cross-examination; (3) the right to present favorable evidence and
to compel the attendance of witnesses; and (4) a specification of the
grounds and underlying facts upon which the determination to
deny parole was based.
In affirming the district court's dismissal of the complaint, the
court began with the basic propositions that, under New York law,
release is discretionary with the New York Board 31 and a parole
denial is beyond judicial review unless the Board has violated a
positive statutory requirement. 32 Focusing upon a rule of the
Board which provided that the inmate's attorney could not be
present at the hearing, 33 the court set forth several reasons why no
process was due an inmate being considered for parole release. As
a matter of substantive law, the court said, two of the essential
29 96 S. Ct. 561 (1975), granting cert. to Bell v. Kentucky Parole Bd., No. 74-1899 (6th
Cir., Jan. 15, 1975) (per curiam). In Bell, the district court dismissed a class action challenge
to the procedures of the Kentucky Parole Board on the ground that due process does not
attach to the parole release decision.
30 430 F.2d 403 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 1023 (1971). The decision in
Menechino was followed in Lewis v. Rockefeller, 431 F.2d 368, 371 (2d Cir. 1970) (refusal to
convene three-judge court).
31 430 F.2d at 405, citing N.Y. CORREC. LAW § 213 (McKinney Supp. 1975); id. § 214
(McKinney 1968), as amended, (McKinney Supp. 1975).
32 430 F.2d at 406, citing Briguglio v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 24 N.Y.2d 21, 246
N.E.2d 512, 298 N.Y.S.2d 704 (1969) and Hines v. State Bd. of Parole, 293 N.Y. 254, 56
N.E.2d 572 (1944). Notably, some recent New York cases manifest a somewhat more liberal
attitude on the part of the judiciary towards correcting allegedly improper parole proceed-
ings. Solari v. Vincent, 46 App. Div. 2d 453, 363 N.Y.S.2d 332 (2d Dep't 1975) (judicial relief
available for abuses of discretion or where minimum due process not accorded); McMoore v.
Regan, 79 Misc. 2d 795, 364 N.Y.S.2d 79 (Sup. Ct. Dutchess County 1974) (Hines doctrine
not a bar to requiring Board to comply with due process by providing reasons for denial).
33 7 N.Y.C.R.R. 1910.10(e) (1974) (formerly 155.9).
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conditions for requiring procedural due process were missing. First,
the Board was not appellant's adversary and its release
proceedings, involving discretionary predictive judgments, did not
require the resolution of disputed issues of fact characteristic of
adversary proceedings and demanding lawyers' skills. Second, the
court, arguing that due process protects interests which are presently
enjoyed, and that a prisoner behind prison walls has no such
present interest entitling him to freedom, held that the prisoner's
interest in parole is not the type of interest protected by the due
process clause, whether that interest be labeled a right or a privi-
lege. In so holding the court analogized the situation of a prisoner
seeking parole to that of an alien seeking entry to the United
States.34
Since prisoners, unlike parolees in the revocation situation, do
not enjoy a present interest, the court further reasoned as a matter
of logical deduction that, in view of the unanimous rejection by
various courts of due process claims in revocation proceedings,
prisoners seeking parole a fortiori are not entitled to due process.
The application of due process to parole release proceedings,
moreover, was regarded by the court as an undue burden on
legitimate governmental interests, since extending various due pro-
cess requirements to the thousands of release decisions made each
year would place too heavy a burden on the state. And, if counsel
were allowed to appear with those able to pay, the court continued,
counsel would also have to be provided for the indigent, who
comprise the majority of prisoners.
Focusing on the prisoner's right to counsel claim, Judge Mans-
field rejected the applicability of Mempa. A parole release determi-
nation, he explained, is not simply a continuation or deferment of
sentencing. While a lawyer may perform functions of a legal nature
at sentencing, he has none to perform at the parole release
proceeding because the release decision is predictive and discre-
tionary. The court did not follow the import of that portion of the
Mempa opinion which indicated that counsel could be useful in
assisting the sentencing judge in reaching sensitive discretionary
judgments involving predictions.3 5 Obviously, the actual holding of
Mempa, as distinct from its language, did not require a different
result. In line with the manner in which it distinguished Mempa, the
" 430 F.2d at 408-09. The court was already struggling with the moribund right-
privilege distinction. Id. at 408 n.3.
"See 389 U.S. at 135. See generally Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S. 736" (1948); M.
FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES: LAW WITHOUT ORDER 37 (1973).
19751
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court concluded that the determination of whether a prisoner is a
good parole risk represents an aspect of prison discipline, not an
adversarial adjudication of rights. Moreover, should federal judges
undertake supervision of disciplinary proceedings, the Menechino
court warned, courts would be flooded with suits for which they
"are not equipped by training and experience. ' 36
One year before Morrissey was decided, in United States ex rel.
Bey v. Connecticut State Board of Parole,37 the Second Circuit held
that the Constitution requires that parolees be afforded legal
assistance at any proceeding to determine whether parole status
should be revoked. To reach this result, Judge (now Chief Judge)
Kaufman distinguished Menechino principally on the ground that it
involved parole release, as opposed to revocation, proceedings.
One might have supposed that the Bey court's emphasis on the
distinction between revocation and release proceedings boded ill
for the rights of inmates in parole release determinations. In United
States ex rel.Johnson v. Chairman of New York State Board of Parole,38
however, Judge Mansfield, again writing on the parole release
question, but this time after Morrissey, offered a different concept
of parole. Johnson was a New York State prisoner who had been
denied parole, but was given no written reasons for the denial.
After losing in a state court review proceeding, Johnson brought a
petition for habeas corpus in the federal court. Treating the
proceeding as a civil rights action, the district court held that the
due process clause of the fourteenth amendment requires that a
state parole board provide inmates with a written statement of
reasons when parole is denied. The panel affirmed.
The State argued, of course, that Menechino precluded such
a result. Nevertheless, Judge Mansfield distinguished his earlier
opinion in Menechino on two grounds. First, while the appellant
there had asked for "a whole gamut of due process rights which he
sought as a package,' 39 Johnson was seeking merely a written
36 430 F.2d at 412.
3' 443 F.2d 1079 (2d Cir.), vacated as moot, 404 U.S. 879 (1971). See also People ex rel.
Menechino v. Warden, 27 N.Y.2d 376, 267 N.E.2d 238, 318 N.Y.S.2d 449 (1971). InBey, the
court, emphasizing the analogy to Mempa, held that the presence of counsel is required in all
parole revocation proceedings. This holding has since been modified, however, by Gagnon v.
Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973), where the Court held that the presence of counsel at
revocation proceedings is required only under limited circumstances. For a recent Second
Circuit case involving parole revocation, see Argo v. United States, 505 F.2d 1374 (2d Cir.
1974).
38 500 F.2d 925 (2d Cir.), vacated as moot, 419 U.S. 1015 (1974). Other circuits also have
stated that a denial of parole without a statement of reasons would be a denial of due
process. United States ex rel. Richerson v. Wolff, 525 F.2d 797 (7th Cir. 1975); Bradford v.
Weinstein, 519 F.2d 728 (4th Cir. 1974), vacated as moot, 96 S. Ct. 347 (1975) (dictum);
Childs v. United States Bd. of Parole, 511 F.2d 1270 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
39 500 F.2d at 926.
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statement of reasons,40 a form of partial relief to which the
Menechino court had given no consideration. Second, the decision
in Menechino - that the New York Board had absolute power to
deny parole and that the prisoner seeking release lacked a
sufficient interest to entitle him to due process - had been
"superseded" by the Supreme Court's rejection of similar reasoning
in Morrissey. Though the decision in Morrissey did not relate to
parole release proceedings, the Second Circuit easily made the leap
by relying upon the broad language of that opinion.
Although, as we have seen, the Bey court by implication sharp-
ly distinguished parole revocation proceedings from parole release
proceedings, the Johnson court now reasoned that "[w]hether the
immediate issue be release or revocation, the stakes are the same:
conditional freedom versus incarceration."' 4 ' This is a logical
deduction, but logic does not explain why the court reversed its
earlier view that the future interest of a prisoner in parole was so
different from a present interest that due process was inapplicable at
a release hearing. The explanation perhaps lies in the Johnson
court's recognition that to the average prisoner parole is no longer
merely a hope but a fixed expectation. Prison and parole
authorities, judges, and prisoners themselves share this
expectation. As the Johnson court wrote:
Our view is strengthened by the fact that most inmates in New
York can expect parole. Fifty-four percent of all prisoners
released from prison in 1970, according to 46 reporting
jurisdictions, left as parolees.... In New York the figure is even
higher. In 1972, for instance, the New York State Parole Board
released 4,412 inmates on parole, or 75.4% of the cases coming
before it .... Thus, the average prisoner, having a better than
50% chance of being granted parole before the expiration of his
maximum sentence, has a substantial "interest" in the outcome.
For him, with such a large stake, the Board's determination
represents one of the most critical decisions that can affect his
life and liberty. 4
2
One might assume, after all this, that Menechino should be
considered overruled. Not so, said the author of both opinions.
While some degree of due process attaches to parole release
proceedings, that does "not necessarily entitle [the inmate] to the
full panoply [of rights]. '43 In explaining why a parole board must
4 0 d. at 926-27.
4 1 Id. at 928.
4 Id. (citations omitted).4 3 Id. We note that we have all accepted the tautology of "full panoply." In due process
language it has become almost a phrase of art. See, e.g., Scarpa v. United States Bd. of Parole,
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state its reasons for denying parole, the court seems to have con-
sidered parole to be an integral part of the sentencing process, a
view which appears to bring the parole cases closer to Mempa. For
example, the Johnson opinion suggests that requiring that reasons
be given for denying parole would serve to build a body of rules
and precedents which would tend to educate the courts
"concerning the probability of parole in particular cases, an
education sorely needed, since judges who exercise their power to
set minimum sentences ... are expected to play an important role
in the parole process. '44 In sum, the court recognized that in the
vast majority of cases the prisoner is actually released on parole
and that judges must therefore have a better apperception of the
likelihood of parole within given periods of time. The opinion
recognized that this knowledge, in turn, will affect the form and
substance of the sentence itself.
The implication of Johnson seems to be that a statement of
reasons is more useful to the parole board itself than to the judges
called upon to review board decisions. The opinion acknowledges,
quite properly, that the statutory standards governing parole
release are so vague that it would be difficult for a court to find
that a parole board had abused its discretion even when a written
statement of its reasons accompanied the denial. Yet, the Johnson
court noted that a statement of reasons would at least enable a
reviewing court to determine whether a board'had followed ra-
tional and consistent criteria and might thereby protect the inmate
from arbitrary and capricious decisions or actions based on
impermissible considerations. 45
In offering additional policy reasons for its decision, the court
touched upon what might seem more proper considerations for a
legislative body, namely, promoting rehabilitation, avoiding inmate
frustration, and the like, worthy goals to be sure. The due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment finally entered into the
Johnson opinion as a reflection of the eighth amendment prohibi-
tion against cruel and inhuman punishment:
The probability of release on parole having been held out to
most prisoners and the possibility of release to the balance,
477 F.2d 278, 282 (5th Cir.) (en banc), vacated and remanded, 414 U.S. 809, dismissed as moot,
501 F.2d 992 (5th Cir. 1973).
14 500 F.2d at 933 (citation omitted). The Johnson court also noted that providing a list of
reasons for the denial of parole would permit judicial review of whether the parole board
impinged on legislative prerogatives. Id. at 930.
" The requirement that reasons be stated to support the revocation of parole has re-
sulted in serious review of the substantive and evidentiary bases therefor. See Douglas v.
Buder, 412 U.S. 430 (1973) (per curiam) (revocation based on traffic citation treated as
arrest so devoid of evidentiary support as to violate due process).
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fundamental fairness would seem to dictate that rather than
subject a prisoner who is denied parole to the inhumanity of
ignorance the state should as a matter of minimum due process
provide him with the reasons. 46
The majority opinion in Johnson ended with the following invitation
to administrative or legislative action:
Nor are we persuaded that guidelines in this area will be so
difficult to formulate that a reasons requirement will lead inevi-
tably to endless litigation concerning the sufficiency of the
written statement provided by the Parole Board.47
This prophecy, uttered in June 1974, was reconsidered by the
Second Circuit in October 1975, when it decided the case of Haymes
v. Regan.48
Haymes was an appeal from an order of the district court
requiring the New York State Board of Parole (1) to provide the
appellee With a statement of the reasons for its decision to deny him
parole as well as the essential facts upon which such denial was
based and (2) to disclose in writing the release criteria utilized in its
decision. Haymes had received only the following as the written
"reason" for the denial: "Held to July 1975 Board with improved
record.'49 The court of appeals affirmed the first part of the order,
but reversed the second. Disclosure of the release criteria, the court
held, is not at this time required as part of the minimum due
process to be accorded the state parole applicant.
The Second Circuit rejected plaintiff's argument that Johnson,
decided just two terms earlier, made it necessary for a board to
disclose the criteria it employed in arriving at the release determi-
nation. In Johnson, Judge Mansfield had stated that
unless and until the Board (1) discloses the release criteria
observed by it and the factors considered by it in determining
whether these criteria are met, and (2) states the grounds for
denial of parole in each case where it is denied, the prisoner, the
community and a reviewing court are left in the dark as to
whether it applied permissible criteria, considered, relevant
factors and acted rationally rather than pursuant to whim and
caprice in any given case.50
46 500 F.2d at 933 (emphasis added). Accord, Bradford v. Weinstein, 519 F.2d 728 (4th
Cir. 1974), vacated as moot, 96 S.Ct. 347 (1975); Childs v. United States Bd. of Parole, 511
F.2d 1270 (D.C. Cir. 1974). Contra, Scarpa v. United States Bd. of Parole, 477 F.2d 278 (5th
Cir.) (en banc), vacated and remanded, 414 U.S. 809, dismissed as moot, 501 F.2d 992 (5th Cir.
1973); Bell v. Kentucky Parole Bd., No. 74-1899 (6th Cir., Jan. 15, 1975) (per curiam).
47 500 F.2d at 934.
48 525 F.2d 540 (2d Cir.), aff'g 394 F. Supp. 711 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
49 394 F. Supp. at 714.
50 500 F.2d at 930 (footnote omitted).
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Chief Judge Kaufman, writing for himself and Judges Friendly
and Smith, dismissed the above as mere dicta, noting that the only
relief sought in Johnson was that a written statement of reasons be
provided when parole is denied.
The holding in Haymes appears to be based squarely on a
balancing of interests test which can change over time. The panel
agreed with the Johnson court's characterization of the interests of
the potential parolee and the power and discretion of the parole
board. Although it acknowledged that "the formulation and pro-
mulgation of more precise rules and criteria"51 would greatly assist
reviewing courts and improve release decisionmaking, the court
found that "the 'need for and usefulness' of such disclosure are
diminished to a critical degree where a specific statement of rea-
sons and underlying facts is furnished to every prisoner denied pa-
role. ' 52 The Haymes holding on disclosure of criteria, however,
was curiously qualified. As the court stated, "such disclosure is not,
at this time, required as part of the minimum due process to be
accorded the parole applicant. ' 53 The Haymes court did not
squarely base its decision on the assumption that there were ade-
quate release criteria in existence. In fact, it accepted the premise
that even in the absence of formulated criteria an articulated
parole decision would "enable a reviewing body to determine
whether appropriate and rational criteria have been followed
.. ..- It was noted, however, that in June 1975 the New York
Legislature had established by amendment that prisoners must be
informed in writing "of 'the facts and reason or reasons for ...
denial [of parole].' '55 The qualification "at this time" may
therefore have been a warning to the New York Legislature to take
the next step and require disclosure of the criteria of judgment as
well, lest the failure to disclose criteria assume constitutional
significance.
In theory, the application of procedural due process to state-
ments of why parole decisions are made implies a concomitant
right of equal protection; for, in theory, a process due one prisoner
should be due another in similar circumstances. It may be that the
panel in Johnson stopped short of requiring disclosure of the
1, 525 F.2d at 543.
52 Id.
53 1d. at 542 (emphasis added).
54 Id. at 544.
5 Id. at 543, citing ch. 131, [1975] N.Y. Laws 180 (McKinney), amending N.Y. CORREC.
LAW § 214 (McKinney 1968) (codified at N.Y. CORREC. LAW § 214(6) (McKinney Supp.
1975)).
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criteria employed by a parole board for the very reason that
disclosure of criteria might, at the same time, disclose unjustified
disparity in treatment, thereby enabling a disappointed prisoner to
contend that "fair play" had been unfairly administered.
56
If the panel in Haymes intended to scotch judicial review of
disparity in parole dispositions, it was not inconsistent with the
judiciary's practice of refusing to review alleged disparity in
sentencing. Indeed, the requirement that a parole board state its
reasons for denial of parole asks more of that board than is
required of the judge who pronounced sentence; for the judge, at
this time, need give no reason at all.5 7 It is not easy to discern why a
judge should be required to state reasons only if so mandated by
statute, while a parole board must state reasons because the
Constitution requires it. Each has discretion within statutory lim-
its, and under the federal guidelines, the factors relied upon by
courts and parole boards in reaching their respective decisions
seem very similar.58 The courts have resisted equal protection attacks
on the disparity of judicial sentences.5 9 There is hardly a logical
basis for applying a different constitutional test to parole decisions
affecting a subset (prisoners) of the very group (convicted
defendants) which may have been sentenced without reasons or
criteria. A convicted person can hardly expect to find a more
generous Constitution when he becomes a prison inmate.
Yet, we must recognize that inmate bitterness is often caused
less by a sense of injustice to self than by resentment of the release
56 The Supreme Court has recognized an equal protection claim where an indigent
prisoner, required to repay legal defense costs advanced by the state, was not afforded
protective exemptions available to other civil judgment debtors. James v. Strange, 407 U.S.
128 (1972). And in Solari v. Vincent, 46 App. Div. 2d 453, 363 N.Y.S.2d 332 (2d Dep't
1975), it was held that inmates similarly situated have a right to equal parole treatment. See
also Bel v. Chernoff, 390 F. Supp. 1256 (D. Mass. 1975) (state has burden of justifying
seemingly disparate parole classifications). In McGinnis v. Royster, 410 U.S. 263, 270 (1973),
the Court said that the "determination of an optimal time for parole eligibility elicited
multiple legislative classifications and groupings, which require only some rational basis
to sustain them."
17 Dorszynski v. United States, 418 U.S. 424, 440-44 (1974).
"8 See Project, Parole Release Decisionmaking, supra note 7, at 892-98.
59 Claims attacking the length or fairness of a sentence are generally defeated on the
principle that the sentencing decision is committed to the discretion of the judge. Gore v.
United States, 357 U.S. 386, 393 (1958); Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 305
(1934). In McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 196-208 (1971), the Court rejected claims
that due process requires that the legislature articulate for the jury rational standards to
guide the decision whether to impose the death penalty. See Weigel, Appellate Revision of
Sentences: To Make the Punishment Fit the Crime, 20 STAN. L. REV. 405 (1968); Note, Equal
Protection Applied to Sentencing, 58 IowA L. REv. 596 (1973). Nonetheless, at least one circuit
has vacated and remanded for reconsideration a sentence pursuant to which a male defend-
ant had received a longer prison term than his codefendant on account of his sex. This was
said to be an impermissible criterion. United States v. Maples, 501 F.2d 985 (4th Cir. 1974).
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of a fellow inmate thought to be less deserving. The furnishing of a
statement of reasons touches only the denial of parole. It is the
failure to circulate the reason why the man in the next cell has been
released that arouses resentment. This core problem can hardly be
solved by the courts. In the many jurisdictions in which the parole
decisionmakers' intuitive responses to the inmate's appearance and
demeanor at a hearing are decisive factors, judicial review is as
unpalatable as appellate court review of the credibility of witnesses.
And in jurisdictions using objective criteria, like those of the
United States Board of Parole, substantive review of release
decisions could automatically add several thousand cases to federal
dockets as disappointed prisoners denied parole seek judicial relief.
II
Recent attempts to obtain judicial supervision of the process
used by the parole systems on constitutional grounds have met with
partial success. But more profoundly, these same attempts by
prisoners have brought responses from legislatures and parole
boards. The enactment of new statutes and codes of procedure
removes the heaviest impediment to judicial intervention. The
efforts made in the microcosm of parole are themselves a teaching
instrument revealing what public opinion considers "due"
prisoners. If parole authorities put their own houses in order,
courts will have to worry less that, as supervisors of the parole
systems, they will be simply overwhelmed by garden variety
claims. 60 Thus, when the court of appeals in Johnson rejected the
argument that the New York Board would be overburdened if it
were required to state reasons for denial of parole, it was fortified
by the knowledge that the United States Board of Parole had
already taken this very step on its own. 61 And, as we have seen, the
New York Legislature followed suit in June 1975.
Insofar as the formulation and disclosure of release criteria are
concerned, the Haymes court recognized that the United States
Board had already promulgated "systemized guidelines for parole
release consideration. '62 In denying "at this time" the constitutional
60 The United States Board of Parole now permits inmates to appear at the initial
interview with a representative who may be an attorney. 28 C.F.R. § 2.12(a) (1975); U.S.
Parole Board Chairman Outlines Reform; Opposes Parts of House Bill, 13 BNA Crim. L. Rep. 2491
(1973), cited in Parole Release Hearings, supra note 2, at 614 n.83. Counsel is not, however,
provided for indigents. Compare Earnest v. Willingham, 406 F.2d 681 (10th Cir. 1969)
(appointment of counsel to appear for indigents at revocation hearings mandated whenever
retained counsel may appear) with Cook v. Whiteside, 505 F.2d 32 (5th Cir. 1974) (state
board not required to appoint counsel for indigents at release hearing).
6 See 500 F.2d at 933.
62 525 F.2d at 544 n.9, citing 28 C.F.R. §§ 2.19-.20 (1975).
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claim that the divulgence of release criteria should be required in
the individual case, the Haymes court nevertheless urged the New
York Board to institute such a requirement on its own. That is
wise; for the United States Board of Parole under Chairman Sigler
has moved far ahead of the courts, and indeed, of the parole
boards of most of the states in adopting procedural and substantive
reforms in the parole release decision process. Among the
procedural reforms the Board has adopted by rule63 are the
following: written reasons specifying certain grounds for the
decision are provided within two weeks of the hearing; inmates are
allowed to have a "representative," who may be a friend, other
inmate, caseworker, spouse, or attorney, present at the hearing; all
hearings are conducted by at least two hearing examiners; and
inmates have a right of administrative appeal from parole denials.
In addition to these procedural reforms- rapidly being adopted
in many states64 - the Federal Board has created, published, and
is using a set of guidelines for decisionmaking.
The guidelines deal with the average total time to be served by
the inmate (including jail time) before release. They establish cate-
gories of offense characteristics based upon the severity of the
behavior associated with the offense. The particular categories
range from "low," for immigration violations or minor theft,
through "low moderate," "moderate," "high," and "very high," to
"greatest," which includes such aggravated felonies as the sale of
hard drugs for profit after a previous conviction, homicide, and
kidnapping. The inmate who has committed a particular offense is
graded individually for his "offender characteristics" and given a
"salient factor score" of "very good," "good," "fair," or "poor" in
terms of parole prognosis. 65 The salient factors, that is, those
found to predict the likelihood of success on parole, consist
primarily of facts in the inmate's past criminal record and reflect
neither institutional conduct or adjustment nor other psychologi-
cal factors. Correlating the offense severity rating with the
offender's salient factor score leads, in turn, to a specific maximum
"See generally Van Blaricom v. Forscht, 473 F.2d 1323 (5th Cir. 1973).
" See Project, Parole Release Decisionmaking, supra note 7, at 816 & n. 17; United States ex
t. Johnson v. Chairman of New York State Bd. of Parole, 500 F.2d 925, 933-34 (2d Cir.
1974) (34 states furnished either oral or written reasons for parole denial).
"' There are nine weighted items: (1) number of prior convictions; (2) number of prior
incarcerations; (3) age at first commitment (whether 18 or older); (4) whether commitment
offense involved auto theft; (5) whether defendant's parole was ever revoked or defendant
was committed for new offense while on parole; (6) history of drug addiction; (7) whether
high school diploma or equivalent was obtained prior to commitment; (8) verified employ-
ment or full-time school attendance for at least six months in last two years in community;
(9) release plan to live with spouse or children. 28 C.F.R. § 2.20 (1975).
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and minimum number of months that should generally be served
before release on parole (except for inmates in the "greatest"
offense severity category).
The guidelines are intended to be objective and to reduce
disparity. 66 If the hearing examiners decide to release an inmate on
parole before or after the time called for by the guidelines, they
must justify this decision by additional explanations in writing, and
the decision must be reviewed by a Board member. Statistics
indicate that in the first two years of use, between 80 and 90
percent of the Board's decisions were within the guidelines.6 7
The guidelines are surely subject to criticism on substantive
grounds: First, the accuracy of parole prognoses is not great; and
second, the Board may have assumed legislative functions in
establishing, without congressional direction, which offenses should
be rated more severely than others.68 Moreover, there is little
doubt that the emphasis of earlier penologists on individualized
treatment has been diminished by the guidelines in favor of more
uniformity. Strict adherence to the guidelines, with reduced
emphasis on conduct in prison, arguably brings them closer to
being equivalent to the actual sentence with minimum and
maximum fixed terms. Attack has already been mounted against
guidelines as a fixed and mechanical approach to a discretionary
decision. 69 One may predict that the ingenuity of counsel and the
'jailhouse lawyers" will spur such efforts and that the sincere
attempt by the Federal Board to put its house in order may become
a nostrum rather than a cure insofar as the unwelcome
involvement of federal judges is concerned. Nevertheless, the value
66 The Yale Project wisely suggests that probation officers who compile presentence
reports should be instructed about how the guideline table works and should write their
reports gearing accurate information to the guideline classifications. See Project, Parole Release
Decisionmaking, supra note 7, at 899. District courts may add to the contents of presentence
reports as provided in rule 32(c) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.6 7 Project, Parole Release Decisionmaking, supra note 7, at 869 n.293. The 80% to 90%
figures on the number of decisions within the guidelines are for 1974 and early 1975. See
generally id. at 867.
61 In a thoughtful discussion in Battle v. Norton, 365 F. Supp. 925, 932 (D. Conn. 1973),
Judge Newman concluded that although in some cases "parole decisions will establish a
minimum sentence," such a result "does not... interfere with the sentencing jurisdiction of
the courts." Id. In that case, Chairman Sigler of the United States Board of Parole tendered
an affidavit in which he stated that offenders who commit the most serious crimes often tend
to be among the best parole risks, while offenders committing certain less serious offenses
often tend to be among the poorest risks. See also United States v. Jenkins, 403 F. Supp. 407
(D. Conn. 1975) (Newman, J.). See addendum.
69See Snyder v. United States Bd. of Parole, 383 F. Supp. 1153 (D. Colo. 1974); cf.
United States v. Norcome, 375 F. Supp. 270, 274-75 n.3 (D.D.C.), affd mem., 497 F.2d 686
(D.C. Cir. 1974); In re Minnis, 7 Cal. 3d 639, 498 P.2d 997, 102 Cal. Rptr. 749 (1972). See
generally United States v. Schwarz, 500 F.2d 1350 (2d Cir. 1974).
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of the guidelines, to the inmate and to society, as a principled rule
of law diminishing disparities in parole treatment is of such
importance that, if this goal is achievable, much else may be
forgiven. 70
III
Yet the United States Board of Parole's use of the guidelines
presents important and novel questions which the federal courts
will have to answer in coming years. 71 It would be impossible to
deal in this brief Article with all of the challenges that may arise. 72
70 See Project, Parole Release Decisionmaking, supra note 7, at 828-40. Some of the hearings
observed in the course of the Yale Project, it should be noted, raised disturbing questions.
For example, two hearing examiners were reported to have made decisions beyond the
guideline range because they felt the judge had been too lenient in sentencing. Id. at 889
n.382.
71 The codification of rules and regulations may make general resort to the Constitution
unnecessary. Such rules will also tend to limit the breadth of the issues presented to the
courts.
72 Two potential challenges to the guidelines do merit some attention. It has been
reported that "as part of the Offense Severity Rating, the Guidelines contemplate considera-
tion of offenses which are either charged in counts dropped as part of the plea agreement or
alleged but not officially charged by the U.S. Attorney." Project, Parole Release Decisionmaking,
supra note 7, at 881; see Grattan v. Sigler, 525 F.2d 329 (9th Cir. 1975). And the more remote
the incidents relied upon are from the crime for which the offender was sentenced, the
greater is the likelihood that an erroneous factual basis is being used. In Kohlman v. Norton,
380 F. Supp. 1073 (D. Conn. 1974), the offense had been rated "very high" on the basis that
the offender used a gun in committing a robbery. Apparently he had not. The court held
that due process had been denied. See also Masiello v. Norton, 364 F. Supp. 1133 (D. Conn.
1973) (unsupported hearsay allegation that petitioner's father was member of organized
crime).
This raises the question whether, under FED. R. CRiM. P. 11, which requires a defendant
who pleads guilty to understand "the consequences of the plea," he must be informed of the
Board's policy on parole release, if indeed, such a policy exists. The assumption to date
probably has been that, aside from salient personal factors, a plea to a lesser offense makes
only that count relevant on parole. A mandatory explanation of what may turn out to be a
pure hypothesis could seriously affect the process of plea bargaining, but it may become
necessary. Compare United States ex rel. Hill v. Ternullo, 510 F.2d 844 (2d Cir. 1975) with
Kelleher v. Henderson, No. 75-2137 (2d Cir., Feb. 18, 1976).
Second, while we have discussed the Board's search for uniformity through the use of its
guidelines, there are exceptions. One is the classification of a prisoner as a "special offender"
or "special case." The label is given by the Bureau of Prisons and the Federal Board to about
500 of the 23,500 inmates in the federal penal system. In euphemistic terms it is applied to
"certain special categories of offenders who require greater case management supervision
than the usual case." Bureau of Prisons, Policy Statement 7900.47, Apr. 30, 1974. In
practice, this generally means that the offender is "a known associate of persons connected
with organized criminal activity." It also means that the invidious classification may retard
parole release, since "special offenders" are within the "original jurisdiction" of the Board
and may be granted parole only through its own en banc action. 28 C.F.R. § 2.17 (1975).
As a further extension of procedural due process, in Cardaropoli v. Norton, 523 F.2d
990 (2d Cir. 1975), it was held that a prisoner is entitled to notice and certain procedural
safeguards before being specially classified. The court based its conclusion, in part, on the
ground that the classification may preclude eligibility for parole release or other "important
rehabilitative programs."Id. at 994-95 (footnote omitted). The availability of counsel in a special
classification hearing is apparently limited, however, to situations in which "the issues are
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One problem that is ultimately beyond the resolve of the courts
alone, however, has been the subject of judicial consideration in
recent Second Circuit cases and will be examined briefly here: the
relationship between the parole board's function and that of the
sentencing judge.7 3
In its attempt to reduce disparity in parole treatment, the
guidelines virtually ignore, as a factor in parole release considera-
tion, the type and length of sentence imposed. As a consequence,
inmates whose sentences are relatively short often are not eligible
for parole under the guidelines at all, i.e. the minimum time called
for under the guidelines arrives after the mandatory release date.
Even inmates with lengthy sentences may serve substantially more
time than the judge had in mind.74
Under the standard federal sentencing provisions, 18 U.S.C. §
4202, 71 the inmate is eligible for parole after serving a third of the
sentence imposed. Under section 4208(a)(1),7 6 however, the court
may impose a minimum term less than this third at the expiration
of which the prisoner becomes eligible for parole. And under
section 4208(a)(2), the court may specify that the prisoner shall
become eligible for parole "at such time as the board of parole may
determine. '77 The (a)(2) sentence was originally established to give
complex or the inmate appears unable to collect or present his evidence." Id. at 996. The court
left open whether there is any judicial review of what is "complex."
Earlier, the Ninth Circuit, in Dennis v. California Adult Auth., 456 F.2d 1240 (9th Cir.
1972), had held that alternatives to representation by counsel could be adequate "in routine
cases" and that "it would be neither necessary nor wise to define administrative due process
strictly in the precise terms of these procedural rights." Id. at 1241. The Supreme Court
itself has used "complex" as a differentiating factor. See Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778,
790 (1973). The need for counsel and other due process protections in this area is apparent
from such cases as Grattan v. Sigler, 525 F.2d 329 (9th Cir. 1975); Robinson v. United States
Bd. of Parole, 403 F. Supp. 638 (W.D.N.Y. 1975); Kohlman v. Norton,supra; and Masiello v.
Norton, supra.
73 For a more extensive discussion of the relationship between the function of the parole
board and that of the sentencing judge, see Project, Parole Release Decisionmaking, supra note 7,
at 882-97.
'4 Effective May 1, 1971, Congress repealed the law which, inter alia, had prohibited
most narcotics offenders from being eligible for parole. Act of Oct. 27, 1970, Pub. L. No.
91-513, § 1101(4)(A), 84 Stat. 1292, repealing Act of Nov. 8, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-793, § 501,
80 Stat. 1449. Although the former provision was preserved for prosecutions for violations
occurring before May 1, 1971, the saving clause did not speak expressly to future parole
eligibility. Act of Oct. 27, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-513, § 1103, 84 Stat. 1294. In Warden v.
Marrero, 417 U.S. 653 (1974), and Bradley v. United States, 410 U.S. 605 (1973), the Court
held that the determination of parole eligibility is part of the sentencing decision and
emphasized that "a pragmatic view of sentencing" indicates that sentencing decisions would "be
drastically affected by a substantial change in the proportion of the sentence required to be
served before becoming eligible [for parole]." 417 U.S. at 658. The Court concluded, therefore,
that the preservation of the former law for prosecutions meant that persons prosecuted for
violations before the May 1, 1971 date would remain ineligible for parole under the relevant
parole provisions, since sentencing itself was part of the prosecution.
75 18 U.S.C. § 4202 (1970).
7n6 d. § 4208(a)(1).
77Id. § 4208(a)(2).
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judges the power to allow parole boards to release an inmate
whenever his release would maximally enhance prospects for
rehabilitation even if that point came before a third of the sentence
had been served.7 8 As a general matter, the (a)(2) sentence has
been assumed by district judges to signal the Board that the
prisoner is expected to be considered for parole before he has
served the statutory minimum time.7 9 In other words, it is used
merely as a more general counterpart of an (a)(1) sentence which
also makes the prisoner eligible for parole before the statutory
minimum has been served.
Under the new parole guidelines, however, rehabilitative
progress and psychological readiness rarely seem to play a role in
the decision as to when release will be allowed.80 Institutional
factors justify release prior to the time indicated by the guidelines
only in exceptional circumstances. Once the guidelines came into
use, it became Board practice to give prisoners sentenced under
(a)(2) a hearing shortly after their imprisonment began, determin-
ing at that time the probable release date. In many cases this date
would be after the expiration of the sentence, 81 and in a majority
of cases well after a third of the sentence had been served. Because
(a)(2) prisoners at the time of this hearing were in the institution
only a short while, there was little information on institutional
factors. In Grasso v. Norton81 this practice was challenged on the
theory that, contrary to statutory and judicial intent, it afforded
(a)(2) prisoners less opportunity than other inmates to exhibit
exceptional institutional performance justifying release before the
"guideline time. ''83
78 See Alvarez v. Turner, 422 F.2d 214, 217 (10th Cir. 1970); Project, Parole Release
Decisionmaking, supra note 7, at 826 n.81, citing Hearings on H.R.J. Res. 424, H.R.J. Res. 425 &
H.R. 8923 Before Subcomm. No. 3 of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., ser.
14, at 6, 8-9 (1958) (testimony of Representative Celler and Deputy Att'y Gen. Walsh).
79See Grasso v. Norton, 520 F.2d 27, 33 (2d Cir. 1975). In Project, Parole Release
Decisionmaking, supra note 7, at 890 n.388, it is reported that many judges believe that when
they impose an (a)(2) sentence they are indicating to the Board that the inmate's rehabilita-
tive progress during incarceration should be the most important factor in determining when
to release him on parole. This finding was based upon a survey questionnaire completed by
64 out of 132 active district court judges in the Board's Northeast Region. See id. at 844
n.159.
10 Less than 20% of the parole release decisions now made are outside either end of the
guidelines. See Project, Parole Release Decisionmaking, supra note 7, at 869 n.293. See also Diaz
v. Norton, 376 F. Supp. 112, 115 (D. Conn. 1974).
8 For example, an inmate who had received a two-year sentence for possession of
marijuana, who had not finished high school, had no dependents, and had been previously
convicted and incarcerated as a juvenile, would be rated as "moderate" in offense severity
and "fair" in parole prognosis under the guidelines. He would ordinarily have to serve 20 to
24 months prior to release on parole. See Boston Evening Globe, Nov. 20, 1974, at 1, col. 4
(interview with U.S. District Judge Joseph Tauro).
82 520 F.2d 27 (2d Cir. 1975).
83 Much interesting data remains uncollated in the Board's research department com-
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Grasso had been sentenced under (a)(2) to a three-year term
and had had his parole hearing less than three months after his
incarceration began. He was notified that his parole was denied
and that his confinement would be continued without a further
parole hearing through the expiration of his three-year sentence.
District Judge Newman held that Grasso was entitled to another
hearing at the expiration of a third of his sentence, the normal
eligibility time, so that he might demonstrate institutional perform-
ance and program achievement to justify his parole release.84
On appeal, the Second Circuit reviewed the divergent posi-
tions several courts have taken with regard to (a)(2) sentences. s5
The Grasso court concluded that, in order to promote the statutory
purpose, a prisoner under an (a)(2) sentence is entitled to "serious
and meaningful parole consideration" before and at "the one-third
point of his sentence. After lengthy analysis the court
concluded:
The decision of the sentencing judge to impose an (a)(2)
sentence, beside relieving a defendant from the restriction placed
on eligibility for parole by Section 4202, is an expression of the
court's expectations (1) that serious and meaningful parole con-
sideration will be given to the prisoner by the Parole Board at an
earlier date than the one-third point of his sentence permitted by
18 U.S.C. § 4202; and (2) that institutional performance and
puters. Figures for 1974 indicate that even among bank robbers- who receive relatively
high sentences in the federal system - 36% of those having (a)(2) sentences of ten years or
more serve longer than a third of the sentence. See United States v. Jenkins, 403 F. Supp.
407, 408-09 (D. Conn. 1975). Since 82% of all federal prison sentences imposed in 1972
were for terms of five years or less, and since most of the guideline time ranges call for
between two and three years of incarceration, most persons receiving (a)(2) sentences serve
substantially more than a third of their sentence. Id. at 408 & n.3, citing Administrative
Office of the United States Courts, Federal Offenders in United States District Courts 1972,
Table 3 (1975).
84 Grasso v. Norton, 371 F. Supp. 171, 175 (D. Conn. 1974). Judge Newman later
directed that Grasso be discharged because the Board had failed to give Grasso an institu-
tional hearing even though a conditional writ of habeas corpus, see id., had previously been
granted. Grasso v. Norton, 376 F. Supp. 116 (D. Conn. 1974). It is from this latter judgment
that the appeal was taken.
" 520 F.2d at 31. Garafola v. Benson, 505 F.2d 1212 (7th Cir. 1974), is in accord with
both positions taken in the district court Grasso cases. While in Stroud v. Weger, 380 F. Supp.
897 (M.D. Pa. 1974), the court agreed that full consideration should be given to (a)(2)
prisoners at "the one-third point," it was held that a file hearing, i.e. a review of the inmate's
file alone, rather than an institutional hearing, would suffice. In contrast, in Moody v.
United States Bd. of Parole, 390 F. Supp. 1403 (N.D. Ga.), aff'd inem., 502 F.2d 1165 (5th
Cir. 1974), the court disagreed with Grasso and held that a comparable decision by the Board
was not reviewable.
In addition to the cases discussed in the opinion, the following cases have also consid-
ered the (a)(2) sentence question: McGee v. Aaron, 523 F.2d 825 (7th Cir. 1975); Bijeol v.
Benson, 513 F.2d 965 (7th Cir. 1975); Salazar v. United States Bd. of Parole, 392 F. Supp.
1073 (E.D. Mich. 1975); Reed v. United States, 388 F. Supp. 725 (D. Kan. 1975).
86 520 F.2d at 33.
FEDERAL COURTS LOOK AT PAROLE
response to rehabilitative programs will be given due effect by
the Parole Board in determining whether parole should be
granted.
These expectations are in accord with the purposes of
Section 4208(a)(2), as indicated by its legislative history .... 87
The decision thus recognized the statutorily defined role of the
sentencing judge in determining eligibility for parole.
But, while acknowledging that a major congressional purpose
was to advance rehabilitation by permitting release at a psychologi-
cally beneficial time, the panel, in an opinion by Judge Frederick
van Pelt Bryan, also emphasized the interest of Congress in reduc-
ing sentence disparity. Although the court sanctioned the use of
the guidelines as applied to (a)(2) prisoners, it reversed Judge
Newman on the question of whether a second hearing must be held
at the "one-third point," thereby sustaining the Board's procedure
of conducting a "file review. 8 8 Judge Feinberg, dissenting from
this second holding, argued that institutional factors relating to
conduct and rehabilitation should be aired at an institutional hear-
ingjust as they are for regular adult (section 4202) prisoners. What
is clear from the majority decision is that the Menechino view - that
decisions of the parole board relate primarily to prison dis-
cipline- has been abandoned.
The circuit's view of the guidelines poses problems for sentenc-
ing judges. In United States v. Slutsky,8 9 the court reversed the
district court's denial of a motion for reduction of sentence under
rule 35 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. The defend-
ants had been sentenced to five years of imprisonment under
section 4208(a)(2) in the spring of 1974, when the use of the
guidelines by the Board was not widely known or understood by
federal judges. Relying on this lack of understanding, the defend-
871d.
s8 Though providing for a file review at the "one-third point" of the sentence would be
sufficient for the future, Judge Newman's grant of the conditional writ was affirmed because
he had not abused his discretion in making such a grant, which had then been ignored by
the Board. Judge Feinberg concurred in the affirmance, but dissented from the majority's
conclusion that a "file review" is enough. He reasoned that "the procedures used by the
Parole Board give insufficient weight to the congressional emphasis on rehabilitation as a
standard for release of (a)(2) prisoners and, in fact, treat them less favorably in this respect
than other inmates .... Id. at 40 (Feinberg, J., concurring and dissenting).
Subsequent to the Second Circuit's decision in Grasso the United States Board of Parole
adopted rules which assure an (a)(2) prisoner the right to a hearing at the "one-third point"
of his sentence. The Board, going beyond the requirements enunciated by the Second
Circuit, provided for an in-person hearing rather than a "file review." 40 Fed. Reg. 41,328,
41,332 (1975). Although these rules moot the actual holding in Grasso, the discussion of
Grasso is intended to illustrate the type of problems which could arise through the use of the
guidelines.
89 514 F.2d 1222 (2d Cir. 1975).
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ants argued that the sentence was based on "a serious mistake of
fact concerning the parole implications of the[ir] sentences." 90 The
court agreed that in view of the guidelines' treatment of (a)(2)
prisoners, "the parole consideration afforded the Slutskys is likely
to depart substantially from what we must assume were the reason-
able expectations of the district judge."9 1 The case was remanded
for resentencing on the theory, recognized in United States v. Mal-
colm9" and United States v. Brown, 93 that sentences based on material
inaccuracies of fact should be vacated. 94
What is significant in Slutsky is that "the parole implications of
a sentence [were recognized as] a necessary and important factor
for the consideration of the sentencing judge. ' 95 With the increas-
ing emphasis on parole as an important part of the sentencing
process, it would seem that an understanding sentencing decision
must take account of the likely parole implications. 96 The Sentenc-
ing Committee of the Judicial Council of the Second Circuit is now
studying methods for diminishing disparity of sentences in light of
the United States Board of Parole guidelines.
IV
From time to time, the news media report public outrage at
the early parole of a criminal who had received a facially long
sentence for having committed a heinous offense. On the other
hand, many inmates are themselves given cause for resentment
when they feel that the parole board has failed to act as the
sentencing judge expected it to. Yet, in the federal system, the
tradition approving the sentencing judge's abandonment of re-
sponsibility for imprisoned defendants is enforced by law. Under
rule 35 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, on motions
made more than 120 days after sentence or affirmance of convic-
9 Id. at 1226.9 1 1d. at 1227.
92432 F.2d 809, 816 (2d Cir. 1970).
93 479 F.2d 1170 (2d Cir. 1973).
94Accord, United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443 (1972).
"United States v. Slutsky, 514 F.2d 1222, 1229 (2d Cir. 1975). In Kortness v. United
States, 514 F.2d 167(8th Cir. 1975), the Eighth Circuit recently held that a sentence, imposed on
the day of publication of guidelines making the prisoner virtually nonparolable for a period of
time, should be vacated under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1970). The court reasoned that the sentence
may have been imposed under the mistaken belief that the prisoner would receive meaningful
parole consideration in the early part of his term - "a critical error.., by the sentencing court."
514 F.2d at 170.
"6See generally United States v. Brown, 479 F.2d 1170, 1173 (2d Cir. 1973); United
States v. Malcolm, 432 F.2d 809, 818-19 (2d Cir. 1970). In United States ex rel. Hill v.
Ternullo, 510 F.2d 844 (2d Cir. 1975), Judge Smith, writing for the panel, found that a
guilty plea entered without knowledge of the minimum statutory period of parole eligibility
was involuntary.
246 [Vol. 50:223
FEDERAL COURTS LOOK AT PAROLE
tion, federal judges have no discretionary power over the length of
a prisoner's incarceration. Once the judge has imposed a prison
sentence, and four months have elapsed from the time of sentence
or affirmance on appeal, he or she is generally powerless to over-
rule the Board of Parole no matter how much the parole decision is
out of line with the court's original intention in imposing the
sentence. The only exception is when some legal error occurred in
the sentencing.
In D'Allessandro v. United States,97 the court was compelled to
reverse a district judge's attempt to circumvent the 120-day juris-
dictional limit of rule 35. After having sentenced the defendant, in
December 1972, to a prison term of four years, the district judge
denied a timely filed motion to reduce. Nineteen months after the
sentence was imposed, the defendant wrote the judge, asking that
his conviction on a plea of guilty be vacated. He went on to
complain that despite an exemplary institutional record and a rec-
ommendation from the judge, under the new guideline system he
had been denied parole and was continued to the expiration of his
sentence. At the hearing on this motion, there was substantial
discussion of how the judge could have originally sentenced D'AI-
lessandro to achieve a more favorable parole result. Ruling that the
original plea was not voluntarily entered, the district judge encour-
aged the defendant to replead, which he did, and imposed a
reduced sentence which resulted in the prisoner's immediate re-
lease.
Since it found that there had been no defect in the original
plea, the court of appeals reversed the judgment vacating the
conviction. The court found that the district judge was actually
attempting to avoid the results of the guidelines' effect on the
sentence he imposed. The court wrote that after the 120-day pe-
riod of rule 35,
release from a stated term of imprisonment is in the hands of the
Board of Parole .... [I]n this case the district judge has, in
effect, taken over functions belonging to the Board.98
As a result, the defendant, sentenced with the apparent expecta-
tion that he would be considered for and released on parole at an
early date, will serve an amount of time greater than that intended
by the sentencing judge.
This is, perhaps, the inevitable result of the statutory scheme
now governing sentencing and parole in the federal system. It is a
97 517 F.2d 429 (2d Cir. 1975).
91 Id. at 430 (citation omitted).
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commonplace that trial is by jury and sentence by the judge. But is
it really? The punishment and deterrence of crime has always been
considered a function of the judicial branch. Congress has pro-
vided a wide range of sentencing options for most offenses so as to
afford district judges great discretion in imposing the initial sen-
tence. Yet the district judge is not the final arbiter of what really
happens to the convicted defendant. He makes the important deci-
sion whether or not to grant probation, and he may exercise super-
visory powers over that term, but once the district judge decides
against probation, his power to control the course and duration of
the sentence imposed is greatly diminished. It is the Bureau of
Prisons which decides where the sentence is to be served and the
Board of Parole which decides, within a wide range, how much of
the sentence will actually be served.
Neither the statutory criteria of parole eligibility nor the
guideline system adopted sua sponte by the Federal Board of
Parole justify this allocation of power. 9 Prison discipline and con-
duct is adequately controlled by "good time" laws and generally
counts for little in present-day federal parole decisionmaking. Nor
is the argument valid that the judge's views need not be regarded
as a weighty factor because judges are not trained in psychology,
penology, sociology, or what makes a malefactor tick; for it is the
same untrained sentencing judge who had to prescribe individ-
ualized treatment for the convicted defendant on the original sen-
tence using the probation report as a tool and who had to decide,
for example, whether to grant youthful offender or NARA treat-
ment. The probation report deals with salient aspects of the of-
fender's personality, including such matters as parental dominance,
sibling rivalry, teenage associations, and the like, and in fact is
heavily relied upon by the Board itself. Thus, it would seem proper
for the judge to have some impact in determining when a prisoner
is released on parole. The experience with (a)(2) sentences, how-
ever, shows that this is hardly the case. Decisions with respect to
parole release may quite regularly be outside the probable expecta-
tions of the sentencing judge.100
'9 Judge Frankel, in commenting upon parole board practice to deny early release on
the grounds of offense severity, stated: "If there was anything for which the sentencing
judge would not be looking to psychologists and other experts outside the law, it was
guidance as to 'the nature of the offense.'" M. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES: LAW WITH-
OUT ORDER 45 (1973).
1°Project, Parole Release Decisionmaking, supra note 7, at 844-45, 882-83 nn. 360 & 361,
894. Communication from judges to the Board has not, in the past, been prevalent. Id. at
893 n.401.
[Vol. 50:223
FEDERAL COURTS LOOK AT PAROLE
Perhaps the existence of the guidelines will better enable the
sentencing judge to predict how much of the sentence he imposes
the defendant is likely to serve. It may lead him, in cases requiring
a shorter prison term, to rely more on the split sentence device, i.e.
a maximum of six months in a jail-type institution with probation
for the rest of the term.10' In view of the difficulties which the
guidelines pose for sentencing judges, Congress might well con-
sider raising the maximum of the jail portion of the split sentence
from six months to twelve. The torture of not knowing a fixed date
for release may be a deterrent to the rehabilitative process itself.
There are many cases involving first offenders where a fixed one-
year term in prison to be followed by a term of supervised proba-
tion is enough to meet the needs of society.
In sum, the Board of Parole is under no obligation to consider
the reasons behind the judge's sentence, and the judge is under no
obligation to state his reasons. The Board cannot minimize dis-
parities between those sentenced to prison and those placed on
probation.' 0 2 The sentencing judge may not be able to fulfill his
sentencing responsibilities without reliance on the Board's guide-
lines. Yet, in the event of changed Board policy, the judge is often
powerless, as we have seen, to make effective his own sentencing
aims.
Congress has, in effect, provided such a wide range of sanc-
tions for each offense, with no standards for their application, that
in the exercise of their discretion some judges will inevitably im-
pose sentences disparate from the norm. There is substantial need
for sentence reform. 0 3 But effective reform of sentencing must be
coordinated with changes in the parole system.' 0 4 This task of
101 18 U.S.C. § 3651 (Supp. IV, 1974). For a discussion of the potential use of the split
sentence, see Project, Parole Release Decisionmaking, supra note 7, at 884.
102 It may be that the most serious disparities in sentencing occur between those granted
probation and those sentenced to prison. See SEMI-ANN AL. REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR, ADMINIS-
TRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS 71, Figure 46 (1975).
0 3 See ABA PROJECT ON STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING TO
SENTENCING ALTERNATIVES AND PROCEDURES § 5.6(ii) (Appr. Draft 1971); ABA PROJECT ON
STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING TO APPELLATE REVIEW OF SENTENCES
§ 2.3(c) (Appr. Draft 1968); M. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES: LAW WITHOUT ORDER (1973);
Kaufman, Foreword: The Sentencing Process and Judicial Inscrutability, 49 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 215
(1975); Motley, "Law and Order" and the CriminalJustice System, 64J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 259, 260,
265-66, 268-69 (1973); Note, The Collective Sentencing Decision in Judicial and Administrative
Contexts, 11 Amt. CRIM. L. REV. 695 701 (1973).
104 In a bill recently introduced by Senator Kennedy, a "Commission on Sentencing"
would be established to set guidelines for sentencing judges. S. 2699, 94th Cong., Ist Sess.
(1975). Perhaps the application of these guidelines will be similar to that of the guidelines of
the United States Board of Parole. Other proposals to reform sentencing and parole laws are
found in S. 1, H.R. 3907, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975); S. 1109, 94th Cong., Ist Sess. (1975);
H.R. 2322, 94th Cong.. Ist Sess. (1975); and H.R. 5727, 94th Cong., Ist Sess. (1975).
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coordination is one for the legislature. Moreover, while certain
courts have timidly relaxed some of the limitations on the reviewa-
bility of sentences, 0 5 many of the judicially imposed reforms appli-
cable to the parole process -specifically, the requirement of rea-
sons - cannot, in the face of judicial precedent, be extended to
sentencing in the absence of statute. Efforts are being made in the
Second Circuit to formulate benchmarks which will serve as a
normal yardstick, subject to stated variations based on significant
personal characteristics of the defendant, to guide judges in sen-
tencing those who have committed various common offenses. That
will, concededly, not be as easy to accomplish with so many inde-
pendent district judges as it was to create a set of guidelines for use
by a single administrative board.
In addition to the problems created by the confines of prece-
dent and statute, there are substantial questions of jurisdiction
which arise from the efforts of the federal judiciary to meet the
challenges of state parole systems. In the case of federal prisoners
directly challenging parole decisions, this circuit has seemingly ap-
proved a habeas corpus basis for jurisdiction.0 6 Under this theory,
the prisoner asserts that he is being illegally confined because he
was unlawfully denied parole due to a defect in the decision pro-
cess. In the case of state prisoners, however, it is not so easy. In
Johnson, and again in Haymes, the court treated the challenges of
state prisoners to parole release procedures as arising under sec-
tion 1983 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871.107 The theory employed
is that the prisoners complain not of the final denial of parole but
of the unconstitutional manner in which the decision is made. 108 If
state prisoners continue to assert jurisdiction under section 1983,
prisoners need not exhaust state remedies, as they would be re-
quired to do in habeas corpus jurisdiction. And the federal courts
might well become, almost unwittingly, the reviewing courts of first
instance of state parole board decisions - surely an undesirable
result.
105 See, e.g., United States v. Hendrix, 505 F.2d 1233, 1235-37 (2d Cir. 1974); United
States v. Maples, 501 F.2d 985, 986-87 (4th Cir. 1974); United States v. Daniels, 446 F.2d
967, 971-72 (6th Cir. 1971).
"6 See Grasso v. Norton, 520 F.2d 27 (2d Cir. 1975). For an explanation of federal
prisoner habeas corpus jurisdiction in parole challenges, see Judge Newman's discussion in
Battle v. Norton, 365 F. Supp. 925, 927-28 (D. Conn. 1973). See also Lupo v. Norton, 371 F.
Supp. 156, 158 (D. Conn. 1974).
107 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) (originally enacted as Act of Apr. 20, 1871, ch. 20, § 1, 17
Stat. 13).
108 In Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475 (1973), the Court seemed to suggest that
challenges related to the "fact or duration" of the confinement itself should, in most cases, be
brought as habeas corpus actions. Id. at 498-99. See also Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471
(1972) (habeas corpus action).
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Thus, the wisdom of the Haymes decision becomes apparent,
for it places the duty to move forward where it belongs: on the
states and, by implication, on the executive and legislative branches
of the federal government. It is sometimes better not to stretch the
Constitution to the limit, but to use it flexibly as a threat overhang-
ing the political process. This is particularly so when the desirability
of retaining the parole board's present role of determining release
dates is placed in doubt by disclosures which suggest that the
sentencing judge could just as easily and just as well fix the date for
presumptive release at sentencing, thereby adding commendably to
the certainty of the punishment imposed. 0 9 With the parole system
becoming so stratified, and with inmate behavior no longer critical,
the question must inevitably arise: Is the journey through the
parole system still necessary?
CONCLUSION
The need for legislative action on both the state and national
levels is urgent. While the federal courts have proved adequate
protectors of procedural rights in the parole process, the goals of
the sentencing and parole system and the authority of judges and
parole boards to implement them can best be determined by the
legislature. But it must always be remembered that neither courts
nor legislatures can, by procedural reform alone, promote the
ultimate goal of rehabilitating offenders so as to eliminate re-
cidivism. The hope for rehabilitation, at the least, requires us to
recognize that inmates must be vocationally trained for economic
survival in lawful pursuits with a good chance for a job. When the
revolving doors of our prisons spew forth the untrained and the
jobless, we are, in many cases, simply guaranteeing their return.
That is why, I think, decisions granting parole so often turn out to
be sadly wrong. Reform of our sentencing and parole systems will
not materially affect the recidivism problem without fundamental
changes in our prisons."' And this will require money and pa-
tience, commodities which the Constitution does not provide.
"' See F. ZIMRING & G. HAWKINS, DETERRENCE: THE LEGAL THREAT IN CRIME CONTROL
141-57 (1973); Antunes & Hart, The Impact of Certainty and Severity of Punishment on Levels of
Crime in American States: An Extended Analysis, 64 J. CraM. L. & CRIMIN. 486 (1973); Project,
Parole Release Decisionmaking, supra note 7, at 886-97.
110 As was reluctantly acknowledged in United States ex rel. Johnson v. Chairman of New
York State Bd. of Parole, 500 F.2d 925, 931 n.5 (2d Cir. 1974), there is grave doubt as to
whether prisons have the capacity to perform the rehabilitative functions which have been
assigned to them. See generally I. KAUFMAN, PRISON: THE JUDGES' DILEMMA (1973); TASK
FORCE ON CORRECTIONS, supra note 9, at 45-47. And we are aware that the parole board may
have no more expertise than the sentencing judge in detecting or promoting that illusive
goal. See Kastenmeier & Eglit, Parole Release Decision-Making: Rehabilitation, Expertise, and the
Demise of Mythology, 22 AM. U.L. REV. 477 (1973).
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Addendum
On March 15, 1976, the President signed the Parole Commission
and Reorganization Act, Pub. L. No. 94-233, 90 Stat. 219. The law
becomes effective sixty days from that date and was passed and signed
after this Article had been written and had gone to press. The law
creates a Commission replacing the present United States Board of
Parole. The Commission is expressly empowered to promulgate
guidelines for the exercise of its power to grant or deny applications
for parole. § 4203(a)(1). Among other items, the new law authorizes
the use of hearing examiners and the division of the country into
regions for the administrative purposes of the Commission. The law
retains the present sentencing provisions embodied in 18 U.S.C.
§§ 4202, 4208(a) (1970) in new § 4205(a),(b). The criteria for parole
eligibility as provided in the new law, § 4206(a),(d), differ in language
from those presently contained in 18 U.S.C. § 4203 (1970), as
amended, (Supp. IV, 1974); however, they do not appear at first
reading to be significantly more specific or to provide any more
guidance for the exercise of the Commission's broad discretion than
do the criteria mentioned in the text accompanying note 8 supra.
The Act does seem to provide for a presumption of parole release
after two-thirds of the sentence imposed has been served if the
sentence exceeds five years. Section 4206(d).
One notable change wrought by the new law is that the sentenc-
ing judge may "at any time upon motion of the Bureau of Prisons...
reduce any minimum term to the time the defendant has served."
§ 4205(g). However, the law fails to address many of the problems
noted in the text above which the guidelines pose for the sentencing
judge. The new law contains many other noteworthy provisions, such
as those governing access by the prisoner to information in his case
files, of which the press of time does not permit discussion or
mention.
